Waters v. Facebook, et al.
This page is not a full merits brief. It isolates the two issues most useful for congressional and public review: whether the case was dismissed without ordinary adversarial process, and whether the pleading stated a plausible procedural-due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A federal civil action arising from alleged witness intimidation, punitive online targeting, and platform-enabled harm tied to ongoing litigation.
The main oversight question is narrower than who should have won: were the pleaded issues actually given a fair adversarial hearing?
Sua sponte dismissal with prejudice and without notice; and the procedural-due-process theory under § 1983.
[Insert exact appeal / post-judgment posture here after checking docket.]
Procedural posture
- October 26, 2020 — Verified complaint filed. The later Rule 60(b) memorandum describes the case as beginning with a verified complaint against multiple named defendants and John Does.
- October 29, 2020 — First emergency injunction sequence. After alleged attacks on potential witnesses, an emergency injunction was sought; the later memorandum says the request was denied without reaching the merits.
- November 12, 2020 — Threat cited as escalation point. The later pleadings describe a threat that, in plaintiff’s telling, made witness naming and ordinary self-representation unsafe.
- [Insert exact February 2021 dates] — Motions to dismiss filed. The Rule 60(b) memorandum says defendants later filed motions to dismiss while plaintiff also sought relief aimed at controlling extrajudicial harassment.
- April 15, 2021 — Proposed amended pleading filed. The uploaded complaint dated April 15, 2021 contains the § 1983 procedural-due-process count highlighted below.
- May 11, 2021 — Case dismissed. The Rule 60(b) memorandum describes the dismissal as sua sponte, with prejudice, and without notice.
- May 13, 2021 — Rule 59(e) motion filed. The post-judgment memorandum argues that the dismissal was entered sua sponte and asks the court to alter or amend judgment.
- September 19, 2021 — Rule 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) motion filed. The motion and memorandum argue that ongoing threats and distribution of threatening content prevented full and fair presentation of the case.
- [Insert notice-of-appeal date, appellate disposition, and any remand history if applicable.]
Short factual background
The underlying theory was that Aidan Kearney used what the complaint described as “weaponized public shaming” to punish people involved in litigation, that threats and harassment made it unsafe to present witnesses and arguments, and that platform defendants continued distributing the material after notice. The complaint’s due-process section also ties the later public targeting to an earlier criminal case that was dropped, followed by alleged sharing of official information with Kearney after the criminal case ended.
Issue 1 Sua sponte dismissal with prejudice and without notice
One-sentence point: the post-judgment filings frame the case as one in which the court dismissed the complaint on its own initiative, with prejudice, after threats and intimidation had already been described as impairing the plaintiff’s ability to litigate.
Can a court dismiss with prejudice on its own motion without first giving notice of the perceived deficiencies and an opportunity to respond?
When dismissal happens before ordinary adversarial correction, appellate review can shift away from the pleaded record and toward defending a new framing of the case.
Element 1 — Notice and opportunity to be heard
Core point: The Rule 60(b) papers argue that dismissal came “without notice” and without a prior opportunity to answer the court’s perceived deficiencies.
Use on this page: Keep this section narrow. Show the standard, then show that the plaintiff later argued he never received the usual chance to respond before dismissal.
Element 2 — Less stringent pleading standard for a pro se complaint
Core point: The Rule 60(b) memorandum argues that the court used the ordinary plausibility formula but did not give full effect to the less-stringent treatment owed to a pro se complaint.
Use on this page: Present this as a process issue, not as a full merits brief. The question is whether the complaint was read as a whole before being terminated with prejudice.
Element 3 — Why dismissal with prejudice is the part that matters
Core point: The later memorandum argues that, at minimum, early-stage dismissal should not have ended the matter with prejudice without allowing supplementation.
Use on this page: Keep this focused on consequence: with-prejudice dismissal converts a curable pleading problem into a terminal judgment.
Issue 2 Procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
One-sentence point: the April 15, 2021 complaint alleged that, after criminal charges were dropped, state-linked actors fed official information to Kearney, Kearney continued punitive public targeting, and witnesses were intimidated from supplying exculpatory evidence.
Count VIII — Procedural Due Process Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, directed to Aidan Kearney.
This is one of the cleanest claims for oversight purposes because it turns on whether the complaint plausibly alleged state-linked deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Element 1 — Under color of law / state action
Complaint theory: After the criminal case was over, Officer Jeremy Haley, Dr. Martha Smith-Blackmore, and at least one John Doe allegedly sent official information to Kearney.
Later framing: The Rule 60(b) memorandum develops this as joint action, encouragement, and symbiotic relationship rather than treating Kearney as purely private.
Element 2 — Deprivation after dismissal of the criminal case
Complaint theory: The pleading says the criminal charges were dropped, that exculpatory evidence was offered afterward, and that Kearney refused it while continuing public accusations.
Use on this page: This section should show why the claim is not just “negative blog posts,” but a due-process theory built around punishment-like public targeting without ordinary safeguards.
Element 3 — Witness intimidation and the right to be heard
Complaint theory: The due-process count says witnesses were intimidated from giving exculpatory evidence, and other parts of the pleading say the threats impaired the ability to litigate and bring in additional witnesses.
Use on this page: This is the strongest public-facing section. It translates a large pleading into one practical question: did intimidation make ordinary access to process less real than it looked on paper?
Element 4 — Injury and causation
Complaint theory: The pleadings tie the alleged deprivation to adjustment disorder, reputational harm, inability to work normally, and inability to litigate safely and effectively.
Use on this page: Keep this section short. It should show that the complaint did not allege only abstract rights, but concrete functional harm.
Documents to keep in the main flow
Keep the main flow to four documents only: the April 15, 2021 complaint, the dismissal order, the Rule 59(e) memorandum, and the September 19, 2021 Rule 60(b) memorandum. Everything else can live under “Full Case File.”
Still needed before final publish
Add the exact dismissal-order quote, confirm the exact docket number and title of the April 15, 2021 amended pleading as you want it labeled on the site, and insert the appeal dates and disposition. The uploaded files support the general timeline, but the dismissal order itself and the appellate end-point should be added directly.
Waters vs Facebook
Case analysis first, then filings in chronological order.
SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT
SAVC EXHIBIT A
Memorandum Rule 60b Motion 09 19 2021
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p. 5 — Sua Sponte Dismissal Legal Standard Shows that case law showing proper legal standard was presented to the court