A. § 1985(2) – Class‑Based Animus Requirement
Governing law: The Supreme Court in Kush v. Rutledge (1983) held that the first clause of § 1985(2)—interference with parties or witnesses in federal court—does not include the equal‑protection language that gives rise to the animus requirement.

Ninth‑Circuit precedent: In Sever v. Alaska Pulp (1992) the court confirmed Kush: no class animus needed for the first clause; Bretz applies to the second clause (state‑court obstruction).

Assessment: The district court relied exclusively on Bretz and treated animus as mandatory, thereby conflating the two clauses. This appears to be a legal error on the face of Ninth‑Circuit authority.
B. Plausibility of a “Conspiracy”
Even without the animus hurdle, the court could still dismiss if allegations of agreement were conclusory. The FAC supplies circumstantial details (timing, private chat screenshots, alleged admissions) that, if true, exceed bare recitals and would ordinarily survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
C. § 1986 Derivative Claim
Properly falls with § 1985; but if § 1985 dismissal was legally flawed, § 1986 should have remained in play.